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Canadian directors  are inundated with U.S. cor-porate governance research, 
leading many directors to assume  
Canadian and American governance 
fundamentals are one and the same. 
But in fact, there are important differ-
ences found in Canadian governance. 
These differences are often 
recognized by high-end cor-
porate lawyers but probably 
not anywhere else, to Canada’s 
detriment. 
In a study sponsored by 
the Canadian Foundation 
for Governance Research, I 
interviewed 32 leading senior legal 
practitioners to gain their insights on 
the underlying principles that form 
a ‘Canadian’ model of governance.1 
The candid observations from these 
practitioners, who provided comments 
on a not-for-attribution basis, reveal a 
surprising legal and regulatory land-
scape in Canada. 
Building Blocks of canadian 
corporate Law
“Shareholders do not have primacy 
in the corporate context in Canada, 
although directors generally think that 
they do,” observed one prac-
titioner. “It is a very difficult 
distinction that the Canadian 
courts have made, based upon 
our corporate statutes, and it 
is a very difficult distinc-
tion to explain to boards of 
directors.”
Some of these distinctions in-
clude the fact that Canadian legisla-
tion requires directors to act in the 
“best interests of the corporation” 
as opposed to the “best interests of 
the shareholders.”2 Canada is also 
fairly unique in its oppression remedy, 
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1 My thanks to the following senior legal practitioners who generously contributed their time and expertise to the study: William M. Ainley, Davies Ward 
Phillips & Vineberg LLP; Rita C. Andreone, Q.C., Lawson Lundell LLP; Jeff Barnes, Borden Ladner Gervais LLP; Noralee Bradley, Osler, Hoskin & 
Harcourt LLP; William J. Braithwaite, Stikeman Elliott LLP; Terrence Burgoyne, Osler, Hoskin & Harcourt LLP; Rob Collins, Blake, Cassels & Graydon 
LLP; Douglas G. Copland, Borden Ladner Gervais LLP; Dallas L. Droppo, Blake, Cassels & Graydon LLP; Aaron S. Emes, Torys LLP; Jean Fraser, Osler, 
Hoskin & Harcourt LLP; Sharon C. Geraghty, Torys LLP; Mitchell H. Gropper, Q.C., Farris, Vaughan, Wills & Murphy LLP; Stephen Halperin, Goodmans 
LLP; Carol Hansell, Hansell LLP; Doug H. Hopkins, Boughton Law Corporation; Michael L. Lee, Lawson Lundell LLP; Robert Lehodey, Q.C., Osler, 
Hoskin & Harcourt LLP; Jon Levin, Fasken Martineau DuMoulin LLP; Andrew J. MacDougall, Osler, Hoskin & Harcourt LLP; R. Hector MacKay-Dunn, 
Q.C., Farris, Vaughan, Wills & Murphy LLP; Margaret C. McNee, McMillan LLP; D. Shawn McReynolds, Davies Ward Phillips & Vineberg LLP; William 
K. Orr, Fasken Martineau DuMoulin LLP; Barry J. Reiter, Bennett Jones LLP; Simon A. Romano, Stikeman Elliott LLP; Richard A. Shaw, Q.C., ICD.D., 
Richard A. Shaw Professional Corp.; John Smith, Lawson Lundell LLP; Rene R. Sorell, McCarthy Tétrault LLP; Tom Theodorakis, McMillan LLP; Edward 
J. Waitzer, Stikeman Elliott LLP; and Marvin Yontef, Bennett Jones LLP. It should be noted that participants spoke for themselves and not necessarily for 
the organizations with which they are affiliated. Their participation should not be construed as an endorsement of the findings highlighted in this article.
2 There was disagreement among the practitioners as to whether or not this was a meaningful difference in practice.  
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which provides a broader right of 
action for minority shareholders and 
other non-shareholder stakeholders.3 
Landmark decisions by the Supreme 
Court of Canada have emphasized 
these statutory differences,4 causing 
many practitioners to inform boards 
that they can – and indeed should – 
take into account non-shareholder 
value issues. Stakeholder interests may 
have always had a role in governance 
under Canadian statutory laws, but the 
courts have now generated a need for 
boards to document their process of 
considering those interests.
Despite the fact that Canadian 
statutes and common law have tended 
to favour a more stakeholder-friendly 
model that assumes greater board con-
trol, the legislators and the courts have 
not proven to be significant leaders in 
the development of corporate gover-
nance standards. Eliciting legislative 
change is an extremely slow progres-
sion and corporate legislation operates 
on a jurisdictional basis. Substantial 
corporate cases in Canada are also few 
and far between, and along with the 
business judgment rule,5 Canadian 
courts simply do not have the instru-
mentalities to promote good gover-
nance standards. 
Power and influence of 
securities regulators
Whether by choice or through the 
process of elimination, the securities 
commissions are now playing a major 
role in shaping Canadian corporate 
governance practices. By virtue of the 
fact that the securities commissions 
have a public interest jurisdiction to 
protect the capital markets,6 and by 
design are investor-focused, their 
influence has pushed Canada toward 
a more shareholder-centric model of 
governance. Securities regulators have 
increased shareholders’ rights well be-
yond what has ever been contemplated 
under Canadian corporate law. 
Many of the surveyed practitioners 
found it a curious Canadian phenom-
enon that the securities regulators are 
significantly affecting the corporate 
legal sphere. Practitioners recounted 
how over a decade ago when the 
securities regulators initially began 
encroaching on a space that was tra-
ditionally for the legislatures and the 
courts, it was extraordinarily con-
troversial. Now, people seem to have 
moved past the notion that the securi-
ties commissions are overstepping 
their jurisdiction and have generally 
accepted the regulators’ role in shap-
ing Canadian corporate governance. 
Since the Canadian Securities Ad-
ministrators (CSA) are able to act on 
a coordinated basis across the nation, 
the organization has become a very 
convenient place to deal with change. 
Institutional investors deliberately seek 
out the CSA to enhance shareholder 
rights, even if, from a philosophical 
perspective, corporate legislation is the 
more appropriate venue.
Practitioners cited some notable 
disadvantages to having the regula-
tors dominate corporate governance 
in Canada. Several pointed to the fact 
that the commissions have often dis-
regarded findings from the courts, are 
not well-versed in evidentiary rules, 
and often fail to establish principles 
that can guide lower courts. A few felt 
that there was no need for securities 
regulators to interfere with the care-
fully engineered corporate structure, 
with one practitioner voicing the 
common sentiment that “what’s in the 
best interest of the shareholder doesn’t 
align with better governance – that’s 
where [the practice] falls down.”
current debate on shareholder 
rights Plans
Canada is considered a very bidder-
friendly jurisdiction. National Policy 
62-202 Take-Over Bids – Defensive 
Tactics leaves Canadian boards with 
a limited number of defenses when 
faced with an unsolicited takeover 
bid.7 This position is now under re-
view in Canada. The CSA has released 
proposed National Instrument 62-105 
Security Holders Rights Plans (NI 62-
105), which would allow target boards 
3 S. 241 of the Canada Business Corporations Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-44.
4 Specifically, Peoples Department Stores Inc (Trustee of) v Wise, 2004 SCC 68 and BCE Inc v 1976 Debentureholders, 2008 SCC 69. 
5 The business judgment rule means that courts will defer to the directors’ business judgment so long as those directors used an appropriate degree of 
prudence and diligence in reaching a reasonable business decision at the particular time the decision was made. See Peoples, supra note 4 at paras 64-65.
6 S. 127(1), para 3 of the Securities Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S-5.
7 National Policy 62-202 Take-Over Bids – Defensive Tactics, online: Ontario Securities Commission <www.osc.gov.on.ca/en/13274.htm>.
“ Whether by choice or through the process of 
elimination, the securities commissions are now 
playing a major role in shaping Canadian corporate 
governance practices. ”
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to implement shareholder rights 
plans (known as “poison pills”)8 for a 
longer period than currently permit-
ted when facing a hostile bid, subject 
to shareholder approval.9 An alterna-
tive proposal has been put forth by 
the Autorité des marchés financiers 
(AMF), the organization mandated 
by the Quebec government to regu-
late Quebec’s financial markets.10 The 
AMF proposal seeks a new regime to 
govern all defensive measures, allow-
ing boards a greater overall arsenal to 
defend target companies in the face of 
unwanted takeover bids. The extended 
comment period for these proposals 
closed in July 2013. 
As one practitioner observed:
The proposals can be seen as a 
subtext of who actually should have ul-
timate decision-making authority in the 
context of change of control transactions: 
whether it should be the shareholders, 
which is the current approach of the 
securities regulatory scheme and the ap-
proach the commissions have tradition-
ally taken on poison pills, or whether 
the boards should be more empowered, 
which is the path the courts seem to have 
taken but the regulators have not.
An overwhelming majority of the 
practitioners did not support the trend 
of greater shareholder control, and 
preferred the AMF proposal. Interest-
ingly, the priorities of the regulators 
and these practitioners are very much 
aligned: getting the highest value for 
shareholders. But while the regula-
tors have tended towards increasing 
shareholder rights in order to accom-
plish that goal, the practitioners in 
the study felt that action is misplaced. 
They contend that directors are in the 
best position to unlock share value, as 
it is their fiduciary duty to act in the 
best interests of the corporation, but 
directors are being denied the proper 
tools to do so. 
The practitioners’ concerns tended 
to focus on how the regulators have 
elected to protect shareholder value. 
They argued it should not be done 
through shareholder approvals, but 
through greater powers bestowed on 
the board to exercise their duties to the 
corporation. 
If indeed the AMF proposal is taken 
to be the position by securities com-
missions across Canada, which some 
practitioners predicted as unlikely, that 
would be a significant step away from 
how Canadian governance is currently 
forming in the M&A context. Indeed, 
as one practitioner put it, “the share-
holder primacy model has different 
ingredients to it,” meaning “there are 
some elements that are stronger than 
in others,” and most importantly, “the 
sands on this can shift.”
toward a canadian Model
Practitioners’ views on an overall 
Canadian model seemed to depend in 
large part on what each practitioner 
found most compelling: the constancy 
of the corporate statutes and trajectory 
of the common law, or the power and 
influence held by the regulators.
The conflicting theoretical positions 
from the courts and the securities com-
missions have enriched the dialogue on 
the current environment of Canadian 
corporate governance. While most 
practitioners felt that Canadian gover-
nance norms and culture are becoming 
quite well-developed, the frequent pull 
in different directions from the regula-
tors and influential power sources in 
Canada have left Canadian governance 
in a “period of uncertainty – we’re still 
trying to figure out what the model 
should be.” 
The common law has made the 
process of considering stakeholders 
in the best interests of the corpora-
tion more overt, well beyond what 
is assumed in Anglo-American 
corporate legal scholarship. Layered 
onto this corporate legal base, the 
securities commissions have provided 
other measures to bolster the field 
of corporate governance in Canada, 
while seeking to protect the integrity 
of the capital markets and the interests 
of investors within those markets. It 
remains to be seen – from the pending 
determinations regarding the CSA’s 
proposed NI 62-105 and the AMF 
proposal – whether the regulators will 
be tempering their positions toward 
shareholder primacy in the future. 
Carol Liao is an SJD/PhD Candidate 
at the University of Toronto and  
the University of British Columbia  
(Joint Program) and a recipient of 
the 2012 Robert Bertram Doctoral 
Research Award. She can be reached 
at carol.liao@mail.utoronto.ca.
The complete study, “A Canadian 
Model of Corporate Governance: 
Insights from Canada’s Leading Legal 
Practitioners,” is available online 
at the Canadian Foundation for 
Governance Research: www.cfgr.com
8 A shareholder rights plan is a defensive tactic employed by companies to discourage hostile takeovers. This is done by making the shares of a company less 
attractive to the potential acquirer, either by allowing existing shareholders to buy more shares at a discount, or allowing shareholders to buy the acquirer’s 
shares at a discounted price after the merger.
9 Canadian Securities Administrators, “Notice and Request for Comment: Proposed National Instrument 62-105 Security Holders Rights Plans, Proposed 
Companion Policy 62-105CP, and Proposed Consequential Amendments” (14 March 2013), online: <www.osc.gov.on.ca>. 
10 Autorité des marchés financiers, “Consultation Paper: An Alternative Approach to Securities Regulators’ Intervention in Defensive Tactics” (14 March 
2013), online: Autorité des marchés financiers <www.lautorite.qc.ca>.
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